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Abstract—There is an increasing demand to make data “open”
to third parties, as data sharing has great benefits in data-
driven decision making. However, with a wide variety of sensitive
data collected, protecting privacy of individuals, communities and
organizations, is an essential factor in making data “open”. The
approaches currently adopted by industry in releasing private
data are often ad hoc and prone to a number of attacks, including
re-identification attacks, as they do not provide adequate privacy
guarantees. While differential privacy has attracted significant
interest from academia and industry by providing rigorous and
reliable privacy guarantees, the reduced utility and inflexibility
of current differentially private algorithms for data release is
a barrier to their use in real-life. This paper aims to address
these two challenges. First, we propose a novel mechanism to
augment the conventional utility of differential privacy by fusing
two Laplace or geometric distributions together. We derive closed
form expressions for entropy, variance of added noise, and
absolute expectation of noise for the proposed piecewise mixtures.
Then the relevant distributions are utilised to theoretically
prove the privacy and accuracy guarantees of the proposed
mechanisms. Second, we show that our proposed mechanisms
have greater flexibility, with three parameters to adjust, giving
better utility in bounding noise, and mitigating larger inaccuracy,
in comparison to typical one-parameter differentially private
mechanisms. We then empirically evaluate the performance of
piecewise mixture distributions with extensive simulations and
with a real-world dataset for both linear count queries and
histogram queries. The empirical results show an increase in all
utility measures considered, while maintaining privacy, for the
piecewise mixture mechanisms compared to standard Laplace or
geometric mechanisms.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, Laplace mechanism, piece-
wise mixture distributions, query release
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of open data platforms12 and Web API stan-
dards34 are enabling researchers and data analysts to provide
revolutionary attractive services, such as travel updates, smart
parking, and health monitoring, in a wide variety of domains.
However, the sensitive nature of certain data categories, such
as health care, is a barrier to evolving these data sharing
platforms. Many government authorities and policy makers
have been proactive in imposing rules and regulations to
safeguard individual privacy and security in releasing data [1].
Privacy preserving online data release has then become more
important than ever so as to enable the use of the data while
not breaching individuals privacy.
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There have been a number of mechanisms proposed to
release private data that are primarily based on either data
aggregation [2], data elimination [3] or data anonymization
[4]. However, the majority of these mechanisms do not provide
guaranteed privacy and they are often susceptible to re-
identification attacks [5], [6]. The pervasive availability of
external public data sources such as social networking data
makes the problem of re-identification with linkage attacks
even more acute [7]. There have been then many mechanisms
based on adding noise to original query answers based on
various bounded [8], and unbounded [9], [10], probabilistic
distributions. Although bounded noise mechanisms provide
some level of protection, privacy can not be guaranteed as
the true value can be recovered with iterative queries. On the
other hand, unbounded noise mechanisms such as Laplace or
Gaussian noise can provide adequate privacy guarantees, but
they often do not provide required accuracy to analysts [11].
Differential privacy has gained much attention in the recent
past as one of the unbounded noise mechanisms to provide
private data release. Differential privacy gives provable guaran-
tees for indistinguishability, and hence privacy, of a particular
participant’s record, and sensitive information, in a database
– as there is no further privacy violation whether or not their
information is in the database. From the initial seminal work
by Dwork et al. [12], adding noise from a zero-mean Laplace
distribution to data queries to ensure robust privacy guarantees,
via ε-differential privacy, e.g., [9], [10], [13]–[15] has become
common-place. The scale parameter of the Laplace distribu-
tion directly relates to the inverse of the privacy budget ε,
where smaller ε and greater scale parameter implies greater
privacy, but less accuracy to the analyst, implying a direct
trade-off between the two. Despite many realms of academic
work to date and its promise in providing provable privacy
guarantees, differential privacy has not yet been adopted by
many in industry and government agencies primarily due to:
i) Concerns over reduced utility of differential private query
release [11]; and ii) Inherent to all the described mechanisms
for differential privacy are a direct function of privacy budget
ε, always with a fixed sensitivity, with little extra flexibility for
the query-mechanism designer, in particular for linear queries.
In this paper, we propose a novel mechanism to draw
noise for differential private query release based on piecewise
mixture distributions, where two separate distributions with
privacy budget parameter ε and rε, r > 0 are fused together
at a break-point ct. The proposed solution comprises two
Laplace distributions and two symmetric geometric (discrete
Laplace) distributions respectively, for fractional query and in-
teger query release. Our mechanisms provide increased utility
benefits while keeping the same privacy guarantees provided
by standard Laplace or geometric distributions. Moreover, the
2dataset curator is provided with three parameters, namely ε,
rε and ct, to control the tradeoffs of privacy loss, utility
and accuracy as opposed to one parameter to manipulate
in these typical differential privacy mechanisms – while the
desirable properties of the Laplace and geometric mechanisms
are maintained. For brevity, we only investigate the benefits
for integer counting and histogram queries, but the proposed
mechanisms are obviously extensible to other types of queries
such as linear fractional queries.
The paper makes the following contributions:
• First, we prove that any mechanism where privacy-
seeking perturbations are kept within desired bounds such
as drawing noise from truncated Laplace or geometric
distributions, in many cases of linear queries do not
preserve differential privacy.
• Then, we propose two piecewise mixture distributions,
as mixtures of Laplace and symmetric geometric mecha-
nisms respectively, that provide guaranteed privacy with
enhanced utility and more flexibility to the query de-
signer.
• We also derive closed-form expressions for the absolute-
first and second moments of the proposed piecewise
mixture mechanisms, as well as the entropy and present
a new general privacy budget parameter ζε relevant to
piecewise mixture mechanisms, with privacy-preserving
properties analogous to ε.
• Finally, we evaluate the proposed mechanisms with exten-
sive probabilistic simulations as well as with a real-world
data set particularly suited to private linear querying.
The results show that proposed piecewise mixture mech-
anisms provides better utility for the analysts compared
to standard Laplace or geometric mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides back-
ground on differential privacy and related work on providing
increased utility. Then, in Section III, we propose piecewise
mixture distribution mechanisms, defining them and providing
their statistical properties, with derivations to analytically
prove their privacy guarantees, as well as determining utility-
privacy tradeoffs. We evaluate and compare their performance
with traditional mechanisms by extensive analysis, simula-
tions, and, importantly, with a real-world dataset in Section
IV. Section V concludes the paper and provides some future
directions.
II. BACKGROUND ON DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Let U be the set of possible data points. A database of n
users contains the data points for each user and can be viewed
as a vector in Un. Let D := Un be the collection of databases
with n users. Two databases X (1) ∈ D and X (2) ∈ D are
called neighboring (denoted by X (1) ∼ X (2)), if they differ
by at most one coordinate.
Definition 1. (ε-differential privacy) A randomized mechanism
(function) M : D → O preserves ε-differential privacy, if for
any two neighboring databases X (1) ∼ X (2), and any possible
set of output S ⊆ O, the following hold:
Pr[M(X (1)) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) · Pr[M(X (2)) ∈ S], (1)
where the randomness comes from the coin flips of M [9].
Remark 1. If O is a countable set, then we can also have the
inequality for each x ∈ O,
Pr[M(X (1)) = x] ≤ exp(ε) · Pr[M(X (2)) = x], (2)
Definition 2. ℓ1 sensitivity. Let f : D → R
d be a deterministic
function. The ℓ1-sensitivity of f , denoted by ∆f , is
maxX (1)∼X (2)‖f(X
(1))− f(X (2))‖1 =
max
X (1)∼X (2)
d∑
i=1
|fi(X
(1))− fi(X
(2))| (3)
The ℓ1, or global, sensitivity of a counting query and a
histogram query ∆f = 1, since removing one user from X
affects the outcome of the query by 1 (in the case of histograms
the cells or bins are disjoint).
It is widely known that adding noise from an appropriately
scaled zero-mean Laplace distribution preserves differential
privacy. For discrete value querying, such as for linear count-
ing queries and histogram queries, the discrete analog of
the Laplace distribution, known as the symmetric geometric
distribution [16], has been widely studied as also preserving
ε-differential privacy, e.g., [17], [18].
A. Laplace mechanism
The zero-mean Laplace distribution (a symmetric version of
the exponential function) has the following probability density
function (PDF):
Lap(x|b) =
1
2b
exp
(
−|x|
b
)
. (4)
We denote a random variable drawn from a Laplace distribu-
tion with scale b as Y ∼ Lap(b). For a linear query, it has
been widely demonstrated that adding noise from a zero-mean
Laplace distribution with scale b = ∆fε satisfies ε-differential
privacy.
The Laplace mechanism is
ML(X ) = f(X ) + (Y1, . . . , Yk) (5)
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap(
∆f
ε ).
Hence, for any queries on neighboring databases X (1), X (2),
then with privacy loss defined as
Lξ
M(X(1))‖M(X(2))
= ln
(
Pr[M(X (2)) = ξ]
Pr[M(X (1)) = ξ]
)
(6)
then for this mechanism Lξ ≤
ln
(
exp
(
ε‖f(X (1))−f(X (2))‖1
∆f
))
so Lξ ≤ ε, for any query
output ξ, where ln(·) denotes the natural logarithm.
B. Geometric mechanism
The Laplace mechanism adds real-number noise to any
linear query, giving differential privacy, and for a general
integer counting query a form of post-processing, to which
ε−differential privacy is immune, the real-number noise can
be rounded to the closest integer. It has been reported
that drawing noise from a symmetric geometric distribution
Geom
(
exp
(
ε
∆f
))
for linear query answering is the discrete
3(integer) analogue of the Laplace distribution, e.g., [17], [18],
this reflects other literature which describes these as discrete
Laplace distributions, e.g., [16]. Thus, it could be expected
that a random variable drawn from a continuous Laplace
distribution could be transformed (e.g., rounded, floored) such
that a symmetric geometrically distributed random variable
results, but this is not the case. The symmetric geometric
probability mass function at any integer k is
Geom(α) =
(
α− 1
α+ 1
)
α−|k|. (7)
Then if α = exp
(
ε
∆f
)
, ε-differential privacy is preserved.
Remark 2. The difference between a Laplace mechanism
mapped to integers and the geometric mechanism (even though
this is from the so-called discrete Laplace distribution) can be
observed from the generation of random variables from their
respective distributions.
Directly from the specification of the Laplace distribution, it
is clear that YLap can be generated from the difference of two
i.i.d. exponentially distributed random variables, exp{·} with
parameter λ = 1/b = ε/∆f , YLap ∼ exp1{λ} − exp2{λ}.
Thus for integer count perturbation ε-differential privacy, the
appropriate rounding gives ⌈exp1{λ} − exp2{λ}⌋ (similarly
the floor ⌊exp1{λ} − exp2{λ}⌋ and ⌈exp1{λ} − exp2{λ}⌉
could equally be applied that would maintain differential
privacy)
The geometric mechanism where α = exp(ε/∆f) is also
related to the exponential distribution. However, where λ =
ε/∆f , then the geometric mechanism is specified by YGeom ∼
⌊exp1{λ}⌋− ⌊exp2{λ}⌋ — hence, it is immediately apparent
that the rounded ε-private Laplace mechanism ⌊YLap⌉ is close
to, but not the same as the ε-private geometric mechanism
YGeom.
C. Mixture distribution mechanisms
The application of distribution mechanisms and their
prospective optimality led to the derivation of optimal mecha-
nisms for a given privacy budget ε. These “geometric staircase
mechanisms” for both differential privacy and approximate
differential privacy are found in [19] and [20] respectively.
There a staircase-shaped mechanism is proposed, as a mixture
of uniform distributions, to optimize usefulness with respect
to ε-differential privacy, as well as result for approximate
differential privacy. Importantly for integer value queries, such
as for histograms and counting queries, the staircase shaped
mechanism reduces to the ε-differentially private symmetric
geometric mechanism [19].
1) Truncated mechanisms: It has recently been reported in
[21] that truncated Laplace mechanisms (as a special case
of what are termed generalized Gaussian distributions) can
preserve ε-differential privacy. But this is dependent on query
release from two neighboring databases X (1) and X (2) sharing
the same bounds. But in a more general (and practical) case,
a truncated Laplace mechanism (or from any other suitable
distribution) will not preserve differential privacy or even
approximate differential privacy. This is evident from the
following example:
Consider queries from X (1) and X (2) (and X (2) has one
more user) with ℓ1 sensitivity ∆f = 1, where we draw noise
from a Laplace distribution with scale factor b, and we only
perturb for query release by ⌈Y ⌋, Y ∼ Lap(b). Now the noise
is only added if in some bound |Y | ≤ c for the two neighboring
databases. Then consider the potential case ⌈|Y (2)|⌋ = c, and
query output ψ from X(2) with noise c added, which has non-
zero probability, then following from (6) consider the privacy
loss,
Lψ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
= ln
(
x2[wherex2 > 0]
x1[wherex1 = 0]
)
=∞. (8)
and the privacy loss L is unbounded, when M(X(1)) 6=
M(X(2)), and there is no differential privacy.
For many cases of querying such as integer count querying,
any truncated mechanism will have unbounded privacy loss,
even though providing better utility to the standard unbounded
Laplace mechanism. In the limit of privacy parameters in
the piecewise mixture distributions we will introduce in the
following sections, the piecewise mixture mechanism defaults
to a standard Laplace, or geometric mechanism, either with
less or more differential privacy, or a truncated Laplace or
geometric mechanism.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE MIXTURE MECHANISMS
A. Laplace Piecewise Mixture Mechanism
We use the concept of the truncated Laplace mechanism to
form what we call a Laplace piecewise mixture mechanism,
where there are effectively two scale parameters b1 and b2,
where the scale parameter b2 is applied around the origin from
−ct to ct, and beyond a suitable point ct not far from the
origin, the smaller scale parameter b1 is applied – effectively
fusing two distributions. As we will show, the key aspect
of the piecewise mixture mechanisms proposed is that the
privacy loss, given any typical query, will vary between a
lower privacy loss (with greater probability) and a higher
privacy loss (with lower probability), and a greatly improved
general privacy budget over standard mechanisms with similar
accuracy performance for linear querying. Differential privacy
is preserved and the dataset curator is provided with more
flexibility in mechanism design.
We set two privacy parameters εr = rε (beyond break-
point ±ct) and ε (within break-point ±ct) where r > 0 and
typically ε ≤ 1. A Laplace piecewise mixture distribution is
denoted as Y ∼ Lapm
(
b2 =
∆f
ε , b1 =
∆f
rε
)
, where set ∆f =
1, with ±ct, at which we effectively fix and combine the two
distributions Y ∼ Lap(1/ε)), Y ∼ Lap(1/(rε)).
Note that as r →∞ then the relevant scale parameter b1 →
0 and the Laplace mixture mechanism tends toward a truncated
Laplace mechanism. Note also that r <∞ is required for the
privacy loss L to remain bounded following from the L privacy
loss description in the previous subsection.
Definition 3. Hence the PDF for Y ∼ Lapm
(
1
ε ,
1
rε
)
, b1 =
1
rε ,
b2 =
1
ε , can be formally given for all x in R as
Lapm(x|b2, b1) =


a1
(2b1)
exp
(
−|x|
b1
)
, |x| > ct
a2
(2b2)
exp
(
−|x|
b2
)
, |x| ≤ ct
(9)
4where a1 and a2 are constants related to the break-point ct
and the scale parameters b1 and b2, designed to keep the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) ≤ 1, and for the PDF
to be continuously defined,
a1 =
p1
(p1 exp(−ct/b1)+p2(1−exp(−ct/b2)))
and
a2 =
p2
(p1 exp(−ct/b1)+p2(1−exp(−ct/b2)))
, where (10)
p1 =
exp(−ct/b2)
b2((1/(2b1)) exp(−ct/b1)+(1/(2b2)) exp(−ct/b2))
and
p2 =
exp(−ct/b1)
b1((1/(2b1)) exp(−ct/b1)+(1/(2b2)) exp(−ct/b2))
.
The CDF (which follows from the process to derive the
standard zero-mean Laplace CDF, where we seek to keep the
continuity of the CDF, specifically in the choice of kC below,
such that there are no step changes) can then be expressed in
closed form as:
LapmC(x|b2, b1) =


a1
2 exp
(
x
b1
)
, x<−ct
a2
2 exp
(
x
b2
)
+ kC , −ct≤x≤0
1−
(
a2
2 exp
(
−x
b2
)
+ kC
)
, 0<x≤ct
1− a12 exp
(
−x
b1
)
, x>ct
(11)
where kC = a1/2 exp (−ct/b1)− a2/2 exp (−ct/b2)) .
Key parameters for the Laplace piecewise mixture mecha-
nisms, is (i). first absolute moment (expectation of noise); (ii).
second moment (variance) and (iii). entropy. These can all be
derived in closed form as follows: (i). The expectation of the
noise E(|x|) can be derived as
ELapm(|x|) =
∫ ∞
−∞
|x|Lapm(x)dx
= a2 (b2 − exp (−ct/b2) (b2 + ct)) (12)
+ a1 exp (−ct/b1) (b1 + ct).
(ii). The variance of the Laplace-piecewise distribution σ2 can
then be derived as
σ2Lapm(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
x2Lapm(x)dx
= 2a2
(
b22 − exp (−ct/b2)
(
b22 + b2ct + c
2
t/2
))
(13)
+ 2a1 exp (−ct/b1)
(
b21 + b1ct + c
2
t /2
)
.
(iii). The entropy HLapm(x) can be derived as
HLapm(x) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
Lapm(x) ln(Lapm(x))dx
= ln(2b2/a2)
(
1− a1 exp
(
−ct
b1
))
+ln(2b1/a1)
(
a1 exp
(
−ct
b1
))
+(a1/b1) exp
(
−
ct
b1
)
(b1+ct) (14)
− (a2/b2) exp
(
−
ct
b2
)
(b2 + ct) + a2.
An example Laplace mixture PDF according to the definition
of (9), with two sets of scale parameters {b2 = 10, b1 = 1} and
{b1 = 10, b2 = 1}, and the two standard Laplace distributions
for bo,1 = 1, bo,2 = 10 (i.e., ε = 1 , ε = 1/10) and bo,3 = 3.36
(i.e., ε = 0.2975) respectively are shown in Fig. 1. Please note
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Fig. 1. Probability Density Function (PDF (Y )) for standard Laplace
mechanisms with ε = 1/10, ε = 1, ε = 0.2975 (respective to b = 1/ε = 10,
b = 1 and b = 3.36) and two Laplace mixture mechanisms Y ∼
Lapm(1/ε = 10, 1/(rε) = 1) and Y ∼ Lapm(1/ε = 1, 1/(rε) = 1/10)
with breakpoint ct = 4.5 shown
Y
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Y∼ Lap(1)
Y ∼ Lap(10)
Y∼ Lap(3.36)
Y ∼ Lap
m
 (1,10)
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Fig. 2. Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF (Y )) for standard Laplace
mechanisms with ε = 1/10, ε = 1, ε = 0.2975, b = 1/ε, and two
Laplace mixture mechanisms Y ∼ Lapm(1/ε = 10, 1/(rε) = 1) and
Y ∼ Lapm(1/ε = 1, 1/(rε) = 1/10) with breakpoint ct = 4.5 shown
that the preferred implementation is for b2 > b1, which is the
Lapm(b2 = 10 = 1/ε, b1 = 1/(rε)) dashed line in Fig. 1. For
Lapm(b2 = 10, b1 = 1) the effective fusing of distributions is
apparent. Example Laplace mixture CDFs according to the
expression in (11) for the same mixture mechanisms and
standard Laplace mechanisms are provided in Fig. 2. Here,
for the preferred Lapm(b2 = 10 = 1/ε, b1 = 1/(rε)), it is
clear that the CDF rapidly tends to 0 and 1 beyond (below
and above) the break-points of −ct and ct respectively.
Thus following from the closed form CDF we can simply
generate Lapm(b2, b1) distributed random variables YLapm
according to Algorithm 1.
For ease of nomenclature, in the remainder of the paper we
refer to the Laplace mixture mechanism as Lapm(ε, rε) rather
than Lapm(1/ε, 1/(rε)). Note that these nomenclatures are
equivalent.
1) Privacy Characteristics of Laplace Mixture Mechanism:
Theorem 1. The Laplace piecewise mixture mechanism is
max{ε, εr = rε} differentially private.
5Algorithm 1: Generating a Laplace-mixture random vari-
able Y ∼ Lapm(b2, b1)
1: Draw variable ru randomly from a uniform distribution in the
range [0, 1], then
2: if ru < (a1/2) exp(−ct/b1) then
3: Y = b1 ln(2ru/a1),
4: else if ru > 1− (a1/2) exp(−ct/b1) then
5: Y = −b1 ln(2(1− ru)/a1),
6: else if ru ≤ 1/2, then
7: Y =
b2 ln (2/a2(ru − (a1/2 exp(−ct/b1)− a2/2 exp(−ct/b2))))
8: else
9: Y =
b2 ln (2/a2(1 − ru − (a1/2 exp(−ct/b1)− a2/2 exp(−ct/b2))))
10: end if
Proof. This can be immediately derived from the two pieces of
the PDF with absolute value of noise |Y | less-than-or-equal,
or greater than the break-point ct. Within ±1 of the break-
point ct the privacy loss tends from ε to εr for neighboring
databases X (1) and X (2). If r > 1 then the piecewise mixture
mechanism is εr differentially private. Hence for true count
ni from f(X
(1)) or f(X (2)):
If |Y (1)|+ ni ≤ ni + ct ∧ |Y
(2)|+ ni ≤ ni + ct
1LM(X(1))‖M(X(2)) = ln
(
exp
(
ε‖f(X (1))− f(X (2))‖1
∆f
))
= ε,
Else, if |Y (1)|+ ni > ni + ct ∧ |Y
(2)|+ ni > ni + ct,
2LM(X(1))‖M(X(2)) = ln
(
exp
(
εr‖f(X
(1))− f(X (2))‖1
∆f
))
= εr,
Else,
3LM(X(1))‖M(X(2)) = ln
(
exp
(
εκ‖f(X
(1))− f(X (2))‖1
∆f
))
= εκ.
where min{ε, εr} < εκ < max{ε, εr},
Remark 3. The privacy loss L(M) = 1L from the CDF with
probability 1−a1 exp(−ct/b1) is bounded by ε where typically
ε≪ εr and a1 exp(−ct/b1)≪ 1.
Furthermore the Laplace mixture mechanism has the fol-
lowing property of accuracy: For query release an attribute
that can take k potential values, or alternatively considering k
i.i.d. random variables Lapm,k added to the true query data
f(X ),
Theorem 2. Lapm(ε, εr) is ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)
useful when
|Lapm(ε, εr)| > ct.
Approximately r/ ln(a1) more useful, i.e., more accurate,
than a differentially private Laplace mechanism with privacy
budget ε, where δ is some small number close to zero.
Proof.
Pr
[
‖f(X )−ML(X )‖∞ ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
= Pr
[
max
i∈[k]
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
(15)
≤ kPr
[
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
= k
(
δ
ka1
)
exp (ln(a1)) ,
= δ.
2) Accuracy/privacy tradeoff by cost formulation: One
measure follows from [19], [22]–[24], where the combined
utility with respect to particular accuracy-losses can be com-
bined in the following metric for expectation of cost of x
Costper.budget = χ =
∫ ∞
−∞
L(x)P(x)dx. (16)
One better quantification of accuracy-loss L(x), is the absolute
value of the noise x added hence L(x) = |x|, which gives the
expectation of the noise amplitude. Then if the probability
distribution at x, P(x) is specified by the zero-mean Laplace
distribution, as per the Laplace mechanism, this integral simply
equals to ∆fε = 1/ε for sensitivity one queries. The expression
for χ where L(x) = |x| for the piecewise mixture Laplace
mechanism with respect to r,ε and the breakpoint at ct is
given in (12).
Another quantification of accuracy-loss is the variance of
the noise where L(x) = x2, which for the zero-mean Laplace
distribution has a value of 2b2 = 2/ε2 for sensitivity one
queries. The expression for χ where L(x) = x2 for the
piecewise mixture Laplace mechanism is given in (13).
B. Geometric Piecewise Mixture Mechanism
We now provide the piecewise mixture mechanism formed
from fusing two discrete Laplace distributions of different
scale parameters α1 = exp(rε), α2 = exp(ε) around a break-
point ct, in a similar manner as applied to continuous Laplace
distributions.
Definition 4. For Y ∼ Geomm (α2, α1), α1 = exp(rε), α2 =
exp(ε), where we set ∆f = 1, the probability mass function
(PMF) of the piecewise mixture geometric mechanism can be
formally given for all x in Z, ct in Z
+ as
Geomm(x|α1, α2) =


a1,g
(
α1−1
α1+1
)
α
−|x|
1 , |x| > ct
a2,g
(
α2−1
α2+1
)
α
−|x|
2 , |x| ≤ ct,
(17)
where
a1,g =
g1
g1α
−ct
1 +g2(1−α
−ct
2 )
a2,g =
g2
g1α
−ct
1 +g2(1−α
−ct
2 )
(18)
g1 = 2
Geom(α2,x=−ct)
Geom(α2,x=−ct)+Geom(α1,x=−ct)
g2 = 2
Geom(α1,x=−ct)
Geom(α2,x=−ct)+Geom(α1,x=−ct)
.
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Fig. 3. Probability Mass Function (PMF (Y )) for standard geometric
mechanisms with ε = 1/10, ε = 1 and ε = 0.2894, and geo-
metric mixture mechanisms Y ∼ Geomm(exp(1/10), exp(1)), Y ∼
Geomm(exp(1), exp(1/10)), where r = 10, 1/10 respectively, with break-
point ct = 5 shown
An example geometric mixture PMF according to the
definition of (17), with two sets of parameters {α2, α1} =
{exp(1/10), exp(1)} and {exp(1), exp(1/10)}, and the two
standard geometric distributions for α = exp(1), α =
exp(1/10) (i.e., ε = 1 , ε = 1/10) and α =
exp(0.2894) respectively are shown in Fig. 3. Please
note that the preferred implementation is for α2 < α1,
which is for Geomm(exp(1/10), exp(1)) in Fig. 3. For
Geomm(exp(1/10), exp(1)) the effective fusing of distribu-
tions is apparent.
Then for all x in R, the CDF of the piecewise geometric
mixture (derived in a similar manner to the CDF of the
piecewise Laplace mixture and the choice of kC below) is
GeommC(x|α1, α2) =


a1,g
α
−⌈x⌉
1
α1+1
, x<−ct
a2,g
α
−⌈x⌉
2
α2+1
+ kC , −ct≤x<0
1− a2,g
α
−⌈x+1⌉
2
α2+1
+ kC , 0≤x≤ct
1− a1,g
α
−⌈x+1⌉|
1
α1+1
, x>ct
(19)
wherekC = a1/2α
−ct
1 − a2/2α
−ct
2
(i). The expectation of noise E(|x|) = χ, which we are
seeking to minimize with respect to privacy budget, for the
geometric piecewise mixture is
χGeomm = 2
∞∑
x=1
xGeomm(x)
= 2a1,g
(ctα1 − ct − 1)α
ct+1
1
α21 − 1
+
2a2,g
(
(ctα2 − ct − 1)α
ct+1
2 + α2
)
α22 − 1
(20)
(ii). The variance of the geometric mixture distribution,
σ2 = χ = E(x2), which we are seeking to minimize, is
σ2Geomm = 2
∞∑
x=1
x2Geomm(x)
= 2a1,g
αct+11
(
c2tα
2
1 − (2c
2
t + 2ct − 1)α1 + (ct + 1)
2
)
(α1 − 1)2
(21)
+ 2a2,g
α2(α2+1)−α
ct+1
2 (c
2
tα
2
2−(2c
2
t+2ct−1)α2+(ct+1)
2)
(α2−1)2(α2+1)
.
(iii). The entropy of the geometric mixture distribution,
HGeomm(x) can be found similarly as
HGeomm = −
∞∑
x=−∞
Geomm(x) ln(Geomm(x))
= −a1,g ln a1,gα
−⌈ct⌉
1 ln
(
α1−1
α1+1
)
+ 2a1,g
(ctα1−ct−1)α
ct+1
1
α21−1
ln(α1)
+ 2a2,g lnα2
×
α2(α2+1)−α
ct+1
2 (c
2
tα
2
2−(2c
2
t+2ct−1)α2+(ct+1)
2)
(α2−1)2(α2+1)
(22)
− a2,g ln a2,g
(
1− α
−⌈ct⌉
1
)
ln
(
α2−1
α2+1
)
.
Thus following from the closed form CDF we can sim-
ply generate Geomm(α2, α1) distributed random variables
YGeomm according to Algorithm 2 below.
For ease of nomenclature, in the remainder of the paper we
refer to the geometric mixture mechanism as Geomm(ε, rε)
rather than Geomm(exp(ε), exp(rε)), as we have referred to
it in this section. Please note that these nomenclatures are
equivalent.
1) Privacy Characteristics of Geometric Mixture Mecha-
nism:
Theorem 3. The geometric piecewise mixture mechanism is
max{ε, εr = rε} differentially private.
Proof. Below the break-point ct of this mechanism the privacy
loss is ε, and above ct the privacy loss is εr, due to the
mechanism generating noise from space of integers, the loss
is either ε or εr.
Algorithm 2: Generating a geometric-mixture random
variable Y ∼ Geomm(α2, α1)
1: α1i = α
−1
1 , α2i = α
−1
2 .
2: Draw variable ru randomly from a uniform distribution in the
range [0, 1], then
3: if ru < a1,g
α
ct
1i
1+α1i
then
4: Y = ⌈ln((1 + α1i)ru/a1,g)/(rε)⌉,
5: else if ru > 1− a1,g
α
ct+1
1i
1+α1i
then
6: Y = ⌈− ln((1− ru)(1 + α1i)/a1,g)/(rε)− 1⌉,
7: else if ru ≤ a2,g
1
1+α2i
+ kc, then
8: Y = ⌈ln((1 + α2i)(ru − kc)/a2,g)/ε⌉,
9: else
10: Y = ⌈− ln((1− ru − kc)(1 + α2i)/a2,g)/ε− 1⌉,
11: end if
7Remark 4. From the CDF, with probability 1− a1α
(−ct)
1 , the
privacy loss L(M) is bounded by ε where typically ε≪ εr in
the preferred implementation of the mechanism, for |x| ≤ ct.
Furthermore the geometric mixture mechanism has the
following property of accuracy: for query release an attribute
that can take k potential values, or alternatively considering k
i.i.d. random variables Geomm,k added to the true query data
f(X ),
Theorem 4. Geomm(ε, εr) is Geomm,u = ln
(
ka1
δ
) (
∆f
εr
)
useful, where ln
(
a1k
δ
)
is a positive integer (in Z+) multiple
of εr when |Geomm(ε, εr)| ≥ ct
Approximately r/ ln(a1) more useful, i.e., more accurate,
than a differentially private geometric mechanism with privacy
budget ε.
Proof.
Pr [|Yi| ≥ p/εr × εr] =
1
exp(p)
where p ∈ Z+
Pr
[
‖f(X )−ML(X )‖∞ ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
= Pr
[
max
i∈[k]
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
(23)
≤ kPr
[
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
ka1
δ
)(
∆f
εr
)]
= k
(
δ
ka1
)
exp (ln(a1)) ,
= δwhere δ ∈
ka1
exp(εrpd)
, s.t.{exp(εrpd) > ka1} ∪ {pd ∈ Z
+}
To account for the variation of privacy parameters ε and
rε around the break-point ct, for comparisons between stan-
dard and piecewise mixture mechanisms, and to evaluate the
general accuracy vs. privacy tradeoffs, we next introduce the
concept of a general privacy budget, which has a very natural
definition, as well as being useful for calculating the real
privacy for rounded mechanisms, such as rounding the Laplace
mechanism.
C. General Privacy Budget
Definition 5. Here we define a general privacy budget ζε, for
neighboring databases X(1),X(2) differing by one coordinate,
and where M(X(2)) 6= M(X(1)), then
ζε = ln


∑
∀ξ
exp
(
|Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
|
)
Pr[M(X (1)) = ξ]


(24)
≈ ln


∑
∀ξ
exp
(
|Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))|
|
)
Pr[M(X (2)) = ξ]


Where | · | is absolute value. This clearly equals ε for any
geometric or Laplace ε-differentially private mechanism, as
|Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
| = ε ∀ξ ∈ Z.
For queries from the piecewise geometric mechanism, with
ℓ1-sensitivity ∆f = 1, this is
exp{ζε} = exp(ε)Pr[YGeomm ≤ ct] + exp(rε)Pr[YGeomm > ct]
ζε = ln (exp(ε)(1 − a1,g exp(−rεct))
+ exp(rε)a1,g exp(−rεct)) (25)
= ln (a1,g(exp(rε)− exp(ε)) + exp(rεct + ε))− rεct
= ε− rεct + ln (a1,g(exp((r − 1)ε)− 1) + exp(rεct)) .
For standard Laplace mechanism, with ∆f = 1, where
noise is rounded to the nearest integer for, e.g., integer count
querying and histogram querying, we find ζε as
exp{ζε} =
Pr[|YLap| < 0.5)]
2
Pr[−0.5 ≥ YLap < −1.5]
+ Pr[|YLap| < 0.5])
+ exp(ε) (Pr[YLap ≤ −1.5] + Pr[YLap ≥ 0.5])
ζε = ln
{
(1− exp(−0.5ε))2
0.5 exp(−0.5ε)− 0.5 exp(−1.5ε)
+ (1− exp(−0.5ε)) (26)
+ exp(ε)(0.5 exp(−1.5ε) + 0.5 exp(0.5ε))} .
For the Laplace piecewise mixture mechanism, for counting
queries with sensitivity ∆f = 1, we find that
exp{ζε} =
Pr[|YLapm | < 0.5)]
2
Pr[−0.5 ≥ YLapm < −1.5]
+ Pr[|YLapm | < 0.5])
+ exp(ε)
(
Pr[−ct ≤ YLapm ≤ −1.5] + Pr[ct ≥ YLapm ≥ 0.5]
)
+ exp(rε)Pr[|YLapm | > ct]
ζε = ln
{
(1− a2 exp(−0.5ε)− 2kC)
2
0.5a2 exp(−0.5ε)− 0.5a2 exp(−1.5ε)
+ (1− a2 exp(−0.5ε)− 2kC) (27)
+exp(ε)a2 (0.5 exp(−1.5ε) + 0.5 exp(0.5ε)− exp(−ctε))
+a1 exp(−rε(ct − 1))} .
For a true count f(X ), we assume that f(X ) ≫ 1 in
(25) and (27) (When f(X ) is close to zero (25) and (27) are
approximations). ζε is bounded between ε and rε, and from
(25) and (27) if r ≫ 1 and ct > 2 then the general privacy
budget ζε is greater than ε, but closer to ε with less privacy
loss. This is the preferred implementation of the piecewise
mixture mechanisms. 5
Proposition 1. The general privacy budget applies under com-
position, if k piecewise mixture mechanisms have a general
privacy budget of ζε,i then their combination has a combined
general privacy budget of
∑k
i=1 ζε,i. This even applies when
there are different break-point bounds, ct,i for each i, as well
as when there are separate εi and/or riεi.
Proof. As for standard ε−differential privacy, for the combi-
nation of k piecewise mixture mechanism, the overall gen-
eral privacy budget is ln(
∏k
i=1 exp(ζε,i)) =
∑k
i=1 ζε,i for
{M1(x),M2(x), . . . ,Mk(x)}. This reduces to
∑k
i=1 εi for
standard mechanisms.
5If, alternatively, r ≪ 1, then ζε is less than ε but closer to ε than rε
with a greater privacy loss.
8Remark 5. Iterative online querying: The above proposition
for general privacy budget composition indicates the value
of the piecewise mixture mechanism for iterative querying
solutions, such as for large-scale querying using mechanisms
such as online multiplicative weights [13], [25], where a
queried dataset is continuously updated. For the same general
level of privacy, the rate at which the dataset is updated, such
as for online multiplicative weights can be reduced according
to a particular ε−related privacy threshold, as the “do-
nothing” case becomes more frequent, due to the perturbed-
noisy query answer occurring more often within a given test-
threshold for updates. Or, equivalently, the threshold can be
tightened with greater general level of privacy, for the same
number of updates as standard online multiplicative weights
(or even offline algorithms such as “dual query” [26]).
Furthermore with respect to general privacy-budget:
Lemma 1. If any mechanism provides ε-differential privacy,
then ζε exists and is bounded by ε. And, conversely, if ζε
exists and is bounded, then the corresponding mechanism will
provide max
(
|Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
|
)
= ε-differential privacy.
Proof. This key lemma follows directly from the definition of
general privacy budget in (24) by either operations on the left-
hand side, or right-hand side, of those equations. If M(·) is
ε-differentially private then privacy loss, Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
≤
ε; ∀ξ, and since Pr[M(X (1)) = ξ] and Pr[M(X (2)) = ξ] are
only defined in region [0, 1], then ζε must exist and be bounded
by ε. As for the converse case, if it is known that the general
privacy budget exists and is bounded, then it must be that
that where ε = max
(
|Lξ
M(X(2))‖M(X(1))
|
)
∀ξ, the relevant
mechanism M(·) is ε-differentially private.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Analytical Utility and Privacy Evaluation
Here we provide values of metrics for general privacy
budget ζε according to (25), (27) for geometric and Laplace-
mixture piecewise mechanisms, given the three parameters of
break-point ct, ε parameter value within break-point and rε
parameter value above breakpoint. We also provide equivalent
privacy budget ε for the Laplace mechanism such that ζε for
the rounded Laplace mechanism according to (26) is equal to
that of (27). The equivalent privacy budget ε for the standard
geometric mechanism is simply equal to (25). We use metrics
for accuracy-loss χ = E(|x|), χ = σ2(x) and entropy H(x)
for Laplace as well as for standard geometric mechanisms, and
Laplace mixture mechanism according to (12),(13) and (14)
respectively; and for geometric mixture mechanism according
to (20), (21) and (22). This is summarized over a large range
of these relevant parameters, with ∆f = 1 in Table I in the
Appendix.
From Table I, in the Appendix, it is clear that significant
benefits in terms of reduced loss for the mixture mechanisms,
with less expected noise and less variance, as well as less
entropy, are achieved over a wide range of ε and rε, and across
the range 4 ≤ ct ≤ 7 considered, with benefits from 0.1 to
0.5 for ε (across the range of ε investigated), and for rε < 2
1
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Fig. 4. Expectation of noise for geometric mixture, E(|x|) versus two mixture
parameters rε,ε and difference from standard geometric mechanism with ε =
ζε{Geomm}, ct = 5
when r > 1. For instance, for ct = 5, ε = 0.2, rε = 1 the
general privacy budgets ζε are approximately equivalent, 0.3
for all mechanisms, and for mixtures compared with standard
mechanisms: the expectation of noise E(|x|) is approximately
less by 0.5, the variance is a factor of 2 smaller, and the
entropy is reduced by around 10%. In Table I, in the Appendix,
it is noteworthy that the greatest relative improvements for
the mixture mechanisms are in terms of variance χ = σ2(x)
(in many cases less than half the variance of the standard
mechanisms), but the improvements in reduced expected noise
E(|x|), and lower entropy H(x), are also significant.
We also plot the two metrics of loss, as well as entropy for
geometric mixture Geomm(ε, rε) and a breakpoint ct = 5,
with a range of two mixture parameters rε (r ≥ 1), ε and
provide the difference from the standard geometric mechanism
with εGeom = ζε{Geomm}. Positive values for this difference
indicate superior performance of the geometric mixture mech-
anism. The first is expectation of noise χ = E(|x|), according
to (20), and we plot this as well as the difference in expectation
of noise χd = E(|x|)Geom − E(|x|)Geomm in Fig. 4. We
also present the log of variance logχ = log σ2(x), σ2(x)
from (21) and plot this in Fig. 5, along with the difference in
log of variance from the standard geometric mechanism with
lχd = log σ
2(x)Geom − log σ
2(x)Geomm . Finally we present
the entropy H(x) and difference in entropy from the standard
geometric mechanism Hd(x) = H(x)Geom − H(x)Geomm
respectively in Fig. 6. In Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 the area of
benefit in terms of each respective metric is provided where,
as ε decreases, even with increasing rε the geometric mixture
outperforms the standard geometric mechanism. These figures
also show benefit for ε up to 1, with the maximum beneficial
values of rε, r > 1, decreasing as ε increases.
B. Utility Evaluation by Simulation
Here we test the performance of the proposed piecewise
mixture mechanisms and compare with standard Laplace and
geometric mechanisms by simulation.
1) Utility Metrics for Simulation: Having already inves-
tigated general privacy budgets, and compared with typical
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mechanism with ε = ζε{Geomm}, ct = 5
privacy budgets, we now seek to provide further suitable
measures of utility. The first metric is the empirical CDF of
the error, Yi for geometric and Laplace mixtures and standard
geometric, which is simply (using ≤ because we are using
integer counts) Pr(|ni − yi| ≤ yt), where yt ∈ {Z
+, 0}
The second metric is mean relative error, when above break-
point ct, as a weighted expectation of the added noise being
greater than ct relative to the true count ni in the dataset
E(|Yi| | |Yi| > ct)Pr(|Yi| > ct)
ni
(28)
where ni is the true count, |Yi| is |ni− yi|, yi being the noisy
count, and Pr(|Yi| > ct) = #(|Yi| > ct)/#Yi, where #(·)
represents the number of elements.
The third metric is Pr(|Yi| ≤ ct) = #(|Yi| ≤ ct)/#Yi, the
probability that the error is within the breakpoint.
2) Simulation Set-up: We generate neighboring
query outputs, n1,n2 with original counts of
n1 = [1, 3, 10, 50, 200, 1000] and neighboring counts
n2 = [1, 3, 10, 50, 200, 1000] + 1 respectively. Hence the ℓ1
sensitivity ∆f = 1. We generate 120 million noise samples,
Y ∈ Z independently from Laplace mixture (generated
as specified in Algorithm 1), standard Laplace, where the
noise samples are rounded to the nearest integer, and from
geometric and geometric mixture (according to Algorithm
2). Then 10 million noise samples, for each mechanism,
are added to each of the six original and six neighboring
counts to generate differentially private output. For the cases
where n + Y < 0 we set Y = −n (thus, for instance, for
differentially private output zero counts occur very regularly
for true counts of 1, and 2). According to Table I, in the
Appendix, for the mixture mechanisms we choose two sets
of values of break-point, ε and rε, {ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1}
and {ct, ε, rε} = {6, 1/10, 1}. The standard Laplace and
geometric mechanisms are simulated such that their ε = ζε
of the Laplace mixture and geometric mixture mechanisms.
Thus these are set at 0.328 when the mixture mechanism
{ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1} and 0.257 respectively when
{ct, ε, rε} = {6, 1/10, 1} for the mixture mechanism. We
also compare with more relaxed privacy budgets of 0.5 and
0.45 for standard geometric and Laplace mechanisms.
3) Simulation Results: We show the probability that the
absolute error for {ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1} is within chosen
break-point, as a bound, of ct = 5; for Laplace mixture
and standard Laplace in Fig. 7a , and geometric mixture and
standard geometric in Fig. 7b, with respect to true counts
∈ n1. There is 5% improvement in error for the mixture
mechanisms with small true counts less than 10, with 95%
within chosen ct = 5 bound, respect to equivalent privacy
budget of standard mechanisms, with equivalent performance
to the less private ε = 1/2 cases for the standard Laplace and
geometric mechanisms in Figs. 7a and 7b respectively. For
true counts of 10 and above there is a 10% improvement of
true counts with respect to the equivalent privacy budget, with
92% of counts within bound for both mixture mechanisms in
Figs. 7a and 7b, with equivalent performance to the less private
ε = 1/2 cases.
In Fig. 8a we plot the CDF of accuracy for {ct, ε, rε} =
{5, 1/5, 1} for the mixture mechanisms, where we note that
there is equal performance accuracy of the geometric and
Laplace mixture mechanisms, approximating the accuracy of
the relaxed privacy budget of standard mechanisms, ε = 1/2,
within the break-point of 5, with 95% of the added noise
being within the break-point, as opposed to 85% for the
equivalent privacy budget. Above the break-point, the mixture
mechanisms approach 100% accuracy, more rapidly than even
the relaxed privacy budget, within absolute error bounds of 8,
as opposed to 12 for the relaxed privacy budget ε = 1/2, and
16 for the equivalent privacy budget. In Fig. 8b we plot the
CDF of accuracy for {ct, ε, rε} = {6, 1/10, 1} for the mixture
mechanisms, close to the 96% accuracy of the relaxed privacy
budget standard mechanisms, ε = 0.45, within the break-
point of 6. Then 94% of the added noise is within the break-
point, as opposed to 84% for the equivalent privacy budget.
Above the break-point, the mixture mechanisms approach
100% accuracy, more rapidly than even the relaxed privacy
budget, within absolute error bounds of 10, as opposed to 11
for the relaxed privacy budget ε = 1/2, and 21 for equivalent
privacy budget.
In terms of weighted mean relative error for |Yi| > ct,
according to (28), with {ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1}, as shown in
Fig. 9a, there is a factor of 3 improvement for the mixture
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Fig. 7. Probability noise is within bounds ct, #(|Yi| ≤ ct)/#Yi Laplace
and geometric mixtures, ε = 1/5, rε = 1, ct = 5 and standard Laplace and
geometric mechanisms with ε = 0.328 and ε = 1/2
mechanisms with respect to equivalent privacy budget of
standard mechanisms, with slightly improved performance,
by a factor of 1.05, to the less private ε = 1/2 cases for
the standard geometric mechanisms (which is also equivalent
to that for the same privacy budget for standard Laplace
mechanism). Furthermore it is clear that there is very small
relative error in Fig. 9a for the mixture mechanisms for any
counts larger than 10, error less than 0.01, and small relative
error for counts above 1. In terms of mean relative error for
{ct, ε, rε} = {6, 1/10, 1} as shown in Fig. 9b there is a factor
of 4 improvement for the mixture mechanisms with respect to
equivalent privacy budget of 0.257 of standard mechanisms.
There is slightly deteriorated performance (by a factor of 1.5)
to the less private ε = 0.45 cases for the standard geometric
mechanism. Furthermore it is clear that there is very small
relative error in Fig. 9a for the mixture mechanisms for any
counts larger than 10, error less than 0.01, and small relative
error for counts above 1. For {ct, ε, rε} = {6, 1/10, 1} as
shown in Fig. 9b, in comparison to {ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1}
as shown in Fig. 9a, there is an increase in relative error, for
this improved privacy budget, only by a factor of 1.2 across
all true counts n, even though the general privacy budget ζε
has improved from 0.328 to 0.257.
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C. Performance Evaluation with a Real-World Dataset
We use the Adult dataset from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository6, extracted from 1994 US census data, which
has been widely used for differential-privacy benchmarking,
including recently in, e.g., [26]–[28]. This dataset contains
32,651 unit records of Census data with 14 attributes. The
dataset manifests 8 categorical attributes and 4 continuous
integer attributes. For the evaluation here, we focus only on the
perturbation of count queries with a random combination of
two attribute values. Therefore, we first study the distribution
of true counts and the characteristics of neighboring databases,
i.e., two databases where one database contains records of one
additional user, from the Adult dataset.
1) Characteristics of the dataset in use: Fig. 10a illustrates
the distribution of true counts for 5 million random combi-
nations of two attribute values. Although such true counts
exhibit a wide range, approximately 20% of the queries result
in a count less than 10. The probability of the query result
being a low count is a significant characteristic of a dataset,
as it increases the general privacy loss due to the rounding
of negative perturbed counts to zero. However, the majority
of the query results are larger values compared to the amount
of noise added from the proposed mechanisms. As a result,
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
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Fig. 9. Mean relative error fraction
E(|Yi| | |Yi|>ct)Pr(|Yi|>ct)
ni
utility measures for the Adult dataset will be higher due to the
smaller error relative to the true count.
As we quantify the privacy loss by comparing two neigh-
boring databases, the true difference in neighboring databases
is also an important characteristic of a dataset. By removing
each user from the dataset, we have created 32,650 different
neighboring databases and then performed 100 random count
queries from each database. We observe that approximately
85% of query answers do not change for the two neighboring
databases. Moreover, the probability of getting a different
count for an individual user in any given two neighboring
databases is also very low. Fig. 10b show that it is almost
normally distributed with a mean value of 0.125. Fig. 10b fur-
ther emphasizes the fact that probability of getting a different
count is less than 0.2. Therefore, whether a person is in the
database or not, is not revealed for approximately 80% of the
random queries even without a privacy preserving mechanism.
2) Utility-Privacy analysis: For utility-privacy analysis,
we consider the performance analysis metrics, absolute
error (|CountTrue − CountNoisy| = |ni − yi|) and mean
relative error fraction
E(|Yi|>ct)Pr(|Yi|>ct)
ni
defined in Section
IV-B and we compare the performance of the proposed
piecewise mixture mechanisms with equivalent standard
Laplace and geometric mechanisms. The standard Laplace
and geometric mechanisms are parameterized such that ε = ζε
of the mixture mechanisms, which resulted in ε = 0.328
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Fig. 10. Characteristics of Adult dataset
for standard mechanisms when the mixture mechanism
{ct, ε, rε} = {5, 1/5, 1}.
Utility measures: The cumulative probability of absolute error
(|CountTrue − CountNoisy|) for all four mechanisms are
shown in Fig. 11a. It shows that absolute error for piecewise
mixture mechanisms are less than 10 in almost in every case
while the maximum also limited to 15 whereas absolute error
for standard mechanisms spreads up to 40. The probability of
absolute error being less than 4 is approximately similar for
all mechanisms. This validates the design goals of piecewise
mixture mechanisms to reduce the probability of getting a
larger error while slightly increasing the probability of getting
a smaller error.
Fig. 11b further validates these aspects with the metric that
is better designed to capture the impact of the break-point,
mean relative error fraction
E(|Yi|>ct)Pr(|Yi|>ct)
ni
(cf. 28). The
lower the mean relative error, the better the utility. Piecewise
mixture mechanisms provide lower relative error compared to
standard mechanisms which are parameterised to provide the
same privacy loss. It also shows that the geometric piecewise
mixture provides slightly better utility as expected due to the
discrete nature of the geometric mechanism and rounding
errors of the Laplace mechanism. For larger ε values, the
performance difference between Laplace and geometric
mechanisms increases as shown in Table I, in the Appendix.
To compare the experimental results with simulations, we
plot the mean relative error against true count in Fig. 11c.
Piecewise mixture mechanisms always result in less error
irrespective of the true count. Furthermore, the results show
similar patterns and almost similar error values compared to
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geometric and Laplace mixtures, ε = 1/5, rε = 1, ct = 5 and standard geometric and Laplace mechanisms with ε = 0.328
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simulations in Fig. 9b.
Privacy measures: Since differential privacy is based on
the premise that there should not be any additional privacy
risk when an individual is in or not in the database, we
quantify the privacy loss of individuals in the Adult dataset
by iteratively removing every user from the dataset. When
the neighboring databases are providing the same answer to
a query, the privacy loss is almost zero irrespective of the
private mechanism used. As the majority (80%) of neighboring
databases are in this category (cf. Fig. 10b), average privacy
loss value is dominated by the similar neighboring databases.
Therefore, we analyse the privacy loss L, according to (6),
separately for similar and different neighboring databases in
Fig. 12a and 12b respectively. To compensate for rounding
errors of continuous Laplace mechanism, we use ε = 0.332
for standard Laplace mechanism, instead of ε = 0.328 for
standard geometric mechanism.
Fig. 12a depicts that privacy loss is almost zero, (< 0.008),
for all queries when the two neighboring databases result in
the same count. There is a jump in the privacy loss value
up to the region closer to the used privacy budget when the
two neighboring databases result in the different counts as
shown in Fig. 12b. Please note that in both cases, piecewise
mixture mechanisms follow the privacy loss of their equivalent
standard mechanisms, whilst the utility of piecewise mixture
mechanisms are superior to standard mechanisms, as shown in
Fig. 11. Thus, these results experimentally validate the design
goals of piecewise mixture mechanisms as they provide better
utility for the same level of privacy loss.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel approach to differen-
tially private statistical distribution mechanisms, giving greater
flexibility to database curators, and providing more accuracy
to analysts. This has been achieved by deriving piecewise
mixture mechanisms, building from the classical Laplace and
symmetric geometric mechanisms that have found wide ap-
plication for ensuring differentially private query release. In
terms of a newly defined parameter, general privacy budget,
closely related to ε in standard differential privacy, the Laplace
and geometric mixture mechanisms demonstrate better per-
formance in terms of various metrics for loss, entropy as
well as accuracy and maintaining added noise within suitable
bounds. Moreover the piecewise mixture distributions enable
mechanism design that can approximate those from truncated
distributions, designed for better utility, without sacrificing
differential privacy, which may often occur if truncated distri-
butions are applied. Importantly, the properties of the Laplace
and geometric piecewise mixture mechanisms are preserved
under composition, and are very advantageous for iterative
online dataset querying such as that in the classical online pri-
vate multiplicative weights algorithm, enabling more querying,
requiring less dataset updates, and better accuracy in released
data. Theoretical analysis, simulation and empirical testing on
13
an open-access dataset has confirmed the favorable properties
of the Laplace and geometric piecewise mechanisms, miti-
gating loss, reducing entropy providing greater accuracy with
respect to general privacy, and enabling most noise to be added
within close numeric bounds to the true data.
In future work we will be applying the piecewise mixture
mechanisms in an online linear iterative setting, determin-
ing appropriate thresholds for dataset updates and precise
quantification of the increase in number of possible query
answers, employing a mixture mechanism, while maintaining
differential privacy. In other future work we will seek to
evaluate the performance of piecewise mixture mechanisms
in the more-relaxed approximate differential privacy setting.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
METRICS OF LOSS, χ = E(|x|), χ = σ2(x) AND ENTROPYH(x) , FOR STANDARD LAPLACE, GEOMETRIC, AND PIECEWISE MIXTURES, FOR VARIOUS ct ,
rε AND ε, GENERAL PRIVACY BUDGETS ζε , EQUIVALENT ε FOR ROUNDED STANDARD LAPLACE AND FOR STANDARD GEOMETRIC ε = ζε{Geomm}
ct ε rε
ζε{Geomm,Lapm}
εLap
E(|x|)[{Geomm,Lapm}
{Geom,Lap}]
σ2[{Geomm,Lapm}
{Geom,Lap}]
H(x)[{Geomm,Lapm},
{Geom,Lap}]
4 0.1 0.2 {0.152,0.148}, 0.154 {5.44,5.46}, {6.57,6.50} {55.72,55.91}, {86.71,84.86} {3.38,3.39}, {3.58,3.57}
4 0.1 0.4 {0.212,0.207}, 0.218 {3.41,3.42}, {4.67,4.59} {19.49,19.62}, {44.20,42.32} {2.89,2.89}, {3.24,3.22}
4 0.1 0.5 {0.235,0.228}, 0.241 {3.04,3.05}, {4.22,4.14} {14.96,15.07}, {36.15,34.50} {2.76,2.76}, {3.14,3.12}
4 0.1 1 {0.334,0.316}, 0.339 {2.39,2.39}, {2.94,2.93} {8.47,8.48}, {17.82,17.45} {2.46,2.46}, {2.78,2.77}
4 0.167 0.333 {0.228,0.219}, 0.231 {3.55,3.57}, {4.35,4.32} {22.88,23.04}, {38.41,37.55} {2.96,2.96}, {3.17,3.16}
4 0.167 0.667 {0.297,0.285}, 0.304 {2.53,2.55}, {3.32,3.28} {10.32,10.41}, {22.53,21.72} {2.58,2.58}, {2.90,2.88}
4 0.167 0.833 {0.326,0.310}, 0.333 {2.36,2.36}, {3.02,2.99} {8.68,8.74}, {18.67,18.10} {2.49,2.49}, {2.81,2.79}
4 0.167 1.67 {0.501,0.445}, 0.491 {2.05,2.04}, {1.92,2.02} {6.27,6.19}, {7.81,8.38} {2.30,2.29}, {2.36,2.40}
4 0.2 0.4 {0.263,0.251}, 0.267 {3.08,3.11}, {3.76,3.74} {17.04,17.20}, {28.84,28.23} {2.81,2.82}, {3.02,3.02}
4 0.2 0.8 {0.335,0.319}, 0.343 {2.31,2.32}, {2.93,2.90} {8.52,8.60}, {17.62,17.11} {2.48,2.48}, {2.78,2.76}
4 0.2 1 {0.368,0.347}, 0.375 {2.17,2.18}, {2.65,2.65} {7.39,7.44}, {14.57,14.28} {2.41,2.41}, {2.68,2.67}
4 0.2 2 {0.597,0.512}, 0.572 {1.95,1.93}, {1.58,1.72} {5.73,5.62}, {5.45,6.19} {2.25,2.24}, {2.18,2.25}
4 0.25 0.5 {0.313,0.296}, 0.317 {2.61,2.64}, {3.15,3.14} {12.10,12.25}, {20.28,19.93} {2.65,2.65}, {2.85,2.84}
4 0.25 1 {0.391,0.366}, 0.398 {2.07,2.08}, {2.49,2.50} {6.88,6.94}, {12.93,12.71} {2.37,2.38}, {2.62,2.61}
4 0.25 1.25 {0.431,0.399}, 0.436 {1.98,1.98}, {2.25,2.28} {6.17,6.20}, {10.60,10.61} {2.31,2.31}, {2.52,2.52}
4 0.25 2.5 {0.761,0.619}, 0.706 {1.83,1.81}, {1.20,1.39} {5.15,5.00}, {3.29,4.09} {2.19,2.18}, {1.92,2.04}
4 0.5 1 {0.548,0.497}, 0.554 {1.57,1.62}, {1.73,1.78} {4.59,4.74}, {6.48,6.59} {2.16,2.17}, {2.27,2.28}
4 0.5 2 {0.654,0.576}, 0.652 {1.44,1.47}, {1.42,1.51} {3.68,3.74}, {4.51,4.79} {2.05,2.05}, {2.08,2.12}
4 0.5 2.5 {0.744,0.633}, 0.723 {1.42,1.44}, {1.23,1.35} {3.56,3.58}, {3.45,3.91} {2.03,2.03}, {1.95,2.02}
5 0.1 0.2 {0.145,0.142}, 0.146 {5.63,5.64}, {6.88,6.82} {58.44,58.63}, {95.19,93.37} {3.42,3.42}, {3.62,3.61}
5 0.1 0.4 {0.194,0.189}, 0.198 {3.72,3.73}, {5.13,5.05} {22.64,22.75}, {53.16,51.34} {2.97,2.97}, {3.33,3.31}
5 0.1 0.5 {0.211,0.206}, 0.216 {3.39,3.39}, {4.70,4.63} {18.08,18.17}, {44.66,43.05} {2.86,2.86}, {3.24,3.23}
5 0.1 1 {0.289,0.274}, 0.292 {2.79,2.78}, {3.41,3.42} {11.40,11.36}, {23.72,23.60} {2.61,2.61}, {2.93,2.93}
5 0.167 0.333 {0.216,0.208}, 0.219 {3.75,3.77}, {4.59,4.57} {25.01,25.17}, {42.69,41.93} {3.01,3.01}, {3.22,3.21}
5 0.167 0.667 {0.269,0.258}, 0.274 {2.84,2.85}, {3.68,3.64} {12.77,12.85}, {27.51,26.81} {2.69,2.69}, {3.00,2.99}
5 0.167 0.833 {0.291,0.277}, 0.295 {2.68,2.69}, {3.39,3.37} {11.14,11.18}, {23.47,23.00} {2.61,2.61}, {2.92,2.91}
5 0.167 1.67 {0.428,0.380}, 0.414 {2.41,2.39}, {2.27,2.40} {8.66,8.54}, {10.77,11.73} {2.46,2.45}, {2.53,2.57}
5 0.2 0.4 {0.249,0.238}, 0.252 {3.28,3.30}, {3.97,3.96} {18.94,19.09}, {32.07,31.58} {2.87,2.87}, {3.08,3.07}
5 0.2 0.8 {0.303,0.288}, 0.308 {2.60,2.61}, {3.25,3.23} {10.73,10.79}, {21.57,21.17} {2.60,2.60}, {2.88,2.87}
5 0.2 1 {0.328,0.309}, 0.332 {2.48,2.49}, {2.99,3.00} {9.61,9.63}, {18.41,18.25} {2.54,2.54}, {2.80,2.80}
5 0.2 2 {0.506,0.435}, 0.479 {2.28,2.27}, {1.90,2.07} {7.92,7.77}, {7.66,8.81} {2.41,2.41}, {2.35,2.43}
5 0.25 0.5 {0.297,0.281}, 0.300 {2.79,2.82}, {3.32,3.32} {13.71,13.86}, {22.51,22.28} {2.71,2.72}, {2.90,2.90}
5 0.25 1 {0.353,0.331}, 0.357 {2.33,2.35}, {2.77,2.78} {8.77,8.82}, {15.85,15.73} {2.49,2.50}, {2.72,2.72}
5 0.25 1.25 {0.383,0.355}, 0.384 {2.25,2.26}, {2.55,2.59} {8.09,8.10}, {13.49,13.62} {2.45,2.45}, {2.64,2.65}
5 0.25 2.5 {0.637,0.520}, 0.582 {2.13,2.11}, {1.47,1.70} {7.06,6.89}, {4.77,5.99} {2.36,2.35}, {2.11,2.23}
5 0.5 1 {0.529,0.479}, 0.532 {1.67,1.72}, {1.81,1.86} {5.31,5.47}, {6.98,7.15} {2.22,2.24}, {2.31,2.32}
5 0.5 2 {0.593,0.526}, 0.590 {1.58,1.62}, {1.59,1.67} {4.56,4.64}, {5.53,5.83} {2.15,2.16}, {2.19,2.22}
5 0.5 2.5 {0.649,0.561}, 0.632 {1.56,1.60}, {1.44,1.56} {4.46,4.51}, {4.58,5.09} {2.14,2.14}, {2.09,2.15}
6 0.1 0.2 {0.139,0.136}, 0.140 {5.82,5.83}, {7.17,7.12} {61.50,61.67}, {103.25,101.58} {3.45,3.45}, {3.66,3.66}
6 0.1 0.4 {0.179,0.175}, 0.182 {4.04,4.05}, {5.55,5.48} {26.15,26.25}, {62.15,60.39} {3.04,3.05}, {3.41,3.40}
6 0.1 0.5 {0.193,0.188}, 0.197 {3.73,3.73}, {5.14,5.08} {21.56,21.63}, {53.37,51.80} {2.95,2.95}, {3.33,3.32}
6 0.1 1 {0.257,0.243}, 0.257 {3.17,3.16}, {3.85,3.88} {14.71,14.64}, {30.19,30.34} {2.73,2.73}, {3.05,3.05}
6 0.167 0.333 {0.207,0.199}, 0.209 {3.95,3.96}, {4.80,4.78} {27.30,27.46}, {46.54,45.91} {3.05,3.06}, {3.26,3.26}
6 0.167 0.667 {0.248,0.238}, 0.251 {3.12,3.13}, {3.99,3.97} {15.44,15.50}, {32.32,31.73} {2.78,2.78}, {3.08,3.07}
6 0.167 0.833 {0.265,0.253}, 0.268 {2.98,2.99}, {3.73,3.72} {13.81,13.83}, {28.26,27.92} {2.72,2.72}, {3.01,3.01}
6 0.167 1.67 {0.374,0.334}, 0.360 {2.74,2.72}, {2.61,2.76} {11.30,11.15}, {14.12,15.48} {2.59,2.59}, {2.66,2.71}
6 0.2 0.4 {0.239,0.228}, 0.241 {3.46,3.48}, {4.15,4.14} {20.95,21.10}, {34.90,34.51} {2.92,2.93}, {3.12,3.12}
6 0.2 0.8 {0.280,0.266}, 0.283 {2.86,2.87}, {3.52,3.52} {13.08,13.14}, {25.31,25.01} {2.70,2.70}, {2.96,2.95}
6 0.2 1 {0.299,0.282}, 0.301 {2.76,2.77}, {3.29,3.31} {11.98,11.99}, {22.18,22.14} {2.65,2.65}, {2.89,2.89}
6 0.2 2 {0.439,0.379}, 0.413 {2.59,2.57}, {2.21,2.40} {10.29,10.11}, {10.23,11.79} {2.55,2.54}, {2.50,2.58}
6 0.25 0.5 {0.286,0.270}, 0.288 {2.96,2.98}, {3.46,3.46} {15.36,15.51}, {24.37,24.22} {2.77,2.77}, {2.94,2.94}
6 0.25 1 {0.327,0.307}, 0.330 {2.57,2.58}, {3.00,3.02} {10.73,10.78}, {18.53,18.50} {2.59,2.59}, {2.80,2.80}
6 0.25 1.25 {0.349,0.324}, 0.349 {2.50,2.51}, {2.81,2.85} {10.07,10.08}, {16.26,16.49} {2.56,2.56}, {2.74,2.75}
6 0.25 2.5 {0.545,0.449}, 0.496 {2.39,2.38}, {1.75,2.00} {9.08,8.89}, {6.57,8.22} {2.49,2.48}, {2.28,2.39}
6 0.5 1 {0.517,0.468}, 0.519 {1.75,1.80}, {1.85,1.91} {5.91,6.09}, {7.31,7.50} {2.27,2.28}, {2.33,2.35}
6 0.5 2 {0.556,0.497}, 0.554 {1.68,1.73}, {1.71,1.78} {5.32,5.43}, {6.30,6.61} {2.22,2.23}, {2.26,2.28}
6 0.5 2.5 {0.591,0.518}, 0.579 {1.67,1.71}, {1.60,1.70} {5.24,5.32}, {5.56,6.04} {2.21,2.22}, {2.19,2.24}
7 0.1 0.2 {0.134,0.131}, 0.135 {6.02,6.03}, {7.43,7.38} {64.82,64.99}, {110.86,109.31} {3.48,3.48}, {3.70,3.69}
7 0.1 0.4 {0.168,0.163}, 0.170 {4.35,4.36}, {5.94,5.88} {29.97,30.06}, {71.06,69.37} {3.11,3.11}, {3.48,3.47}
7 0.1 0.5 {0.179,0.174}, 0.182 {4.06,4.06}, {5.55,5.50} {25.37,25.42}, {62.14,60.66} {3.03,3.03}, {3.41,3.40}
7 0.1 1 {0.232,0.219}, 0.231 {3.54,3.53}, {4.28,4.32} {18.36,18.27}, {37.12,37.57} {2.84,2.84}, {3.15,3.16}
7 0.167 0.333 {0.200,0.192}, 0.201 {4.13,4.15}, {4.97,4.96} {29.70,29.86}, {49.96,49.47} {3.10,3.10}, {3.30,3.30}
7 0.167 0.667 {0.232,0.223}, 0.235 {3.39,3.40}, {4.26,4.25} {18.25,18.30}, {36.87,36.37} {2.86,2.86}, {3.15,3.14}
7 0.167 0.833 {0.246,0.235}, 0.248 {3.27,3.27}, {4.02,4.03} {16.64,16.65}, {32.89,32.67} {2.81,2.81}, {3.09,3.09}
7 0.167 1.67 {0.334,0.299}, 0.321 {3.05,3.03}, {2.94,3.10} {14.12,13.94}, {17.79,19.52} {2.71,2.70}, {2.78,2.83}
7 0.2 0.4 {0.231,0.221}, 0.233 {3.63,3.65}, {4.29,4.29} {23.00,23.15}, {37.34,37.05} {2.97,2.97}, {3.15,3.15}
7 0.2 0.8 {0.263,0.250}, 0.265 {3.11,3.12}, {3.76,3.76} {15.52,15.57}, {28.75,28.56} {2.78,2.78}, {3.02,3.02}
7 0.2 1 {0.278,0.262}, 0.279 {3.02,3.02}, {3.55,3.58} {14.45,14.45}, {25.77,25.82} {2.74,2.74}, {2.97,2.97}
7 0.2 2 {0.388,0.339}, 0.366 {2.86,2.85}, {2.51,2.72} {12.77,12.58}, {13.09,15.03} {2.66,2.65}, {2.63,2.70}
